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Abstract
We consider the problem of remote authentication over a long range wireless network using large signature keys
such as biometric samples (fingerprint, retinal scans etc.). Because ofth large size of these keys, and continual
need for authentication, considerable power and bandwidth is consumed by such processes. We show that by
using the concept of aholographic proof, it is possible to significantly cut down the number of bytes transferred.
While bandwidth savings is obvious, for long range wireless this means hugesavings in power which is a critical
resource for mobile devices. Our approach trades computaion for communication, the intuition being that power
requirement for transmitting one byte over wireless is orders of magnitudehigher than executing one instruction
on a standard processor. Our simulations provide a detailed analysis of power savings under a reasonable energy-
consumption model and indeed demonstrate the effectiveness of such approach.
1 Introduction
As wireless communication is becomingpervasivealong with computing, a new continuum of computation
and communication is being born. Amongst a plethora of research issues eng ndered by this paradigm, security
is quite critical. One can easily envision people accessing confidential documents from secured information stores
onto devices such as palm-tops or cell-phones. Safe remote authentication isthe key enabler of such ubiquitous
accesses. The scenario differs considerably from the traditional networked computing systems: First, the devices
in the new paradigm are mostly small and mobile; hence the connections are often reset and reestablished, result-
ing in fresh authentication activities. Second, as the new devices come more and more equipped with variety of
sensors, it is natural to expect that confidentiality checks be performedat r gular intervals without intervening the
user activities; for example, while a person tries to access some financial do uments in a busy airport through her
cell-phone, the attached camera would be continually taking the picture of herface and would authenticate with
the face recognition unit at the remote end ensuring that whenever the particular person stops using the phone, the
right to access the documents is immediately revoked. Third, since the bandwidth is limited, such authentication
protocols, however secure they might make the system, have to guarantee that they do not add substantial transport
overhead. Which leads to probably the scarcest of the resources formobile devices, viz., power. Since, long range
wireless transmissions eat up batteries very fast, the challenge is to guarantee that a new security architecture such
as this one, is not rendered useless by its power overhead.
In a foreseeable future, the primary mode of authentication will be sensor-based. One major advantage of such
schemes over traditional password-based ones, is naturally the reduction in user intervention. However, another
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important and often overlooked benefit is the size of the signature keys. While a password must be small for
memorizing, sensor generated keys, such as biometrics are often quite large in size. High entropy offered by such
keys makes it difficult for any adversary to reproduce them unlike password protection that is amenable to many
attacks. In the light of the fact that authentication is done in continual fashion, the large key-size becomes even
more critical from the viewpoint of power-consumption.
A potential solution to key length could be the use of cryptographic hash; instead of sending the whole key,
one might consider sending a digest to be compared with the digest of the keystor d at the remote end. But such
a scheme fails in our case. The scenario we are considering here is subject to two factors that prevents the use
of digests. First, sensors have inherent inaccuracy and sampling different. Therefore, two samples of the same
object, such as a fingerprint, generated by two different sensors aremost likely identical, although they are pat-
terns close to each other according to some distance metric. Second, the conditions in which two samples are
taken vary considerably over time; for example fingerprints of a person take by the same device during different
working conditions will most likely turn out to be different. One should therefo look for aclose match, instead
of identity. Cryptographic hash functions however, do not tend to preserv such metrics, two bit-strings slightly
different could produce very different hash digests.
In this paper we present a technique that enables remote authentication over long range wireless in a contin-
ual fashion; even with keys of large size, this scheme results in significantlyreduced consumption in bandwidth
and hence power. The key ingredient in our approach is a concept ofa holographic proof. Instead of providing
a mathematical definition, we provide an informal description that would suffice for the purpose of reading this
paper. A hologram is the imprint of an object (usually in 3 dimensions) such that every part of it contains a copy
of the whole imprint; if a hologram is cut into two haves, each half will provide the full imprint of that object.
Intuitively a holographic proof attempts to mimic this property. A proof (in our case, an authentication token) can
be encoded so that almost every part of it carries the signature of this proof. Then, a verifier (in this case, a server
authenticating the received token against a stored template token) can examinonly a small segment of the proof
and still be able to verify that the proof is correct.
How does one construct such a proof? Error correction codes provide a candidate infrastructure for constructing
such proofs. Normally an error correction code expands a bit-string byaddingredundancyso that even in the
presence of corrupted, or missing bits, the original data can be recoverd. Now, the primary task of authenticating
is the following: One party presents an authentication token (s) to a server which matches this token against a
stored template (s′) to see ifs ≈ s′, i.e., if there is a close match between the two. However, one could reverse th
question. Instead of asking if they are same (or close to each other), onecan ask if the two strings are different.
Now, if these strings are suitably encoded by adding redundancy, then itmay be indeed possible to check that
they are different by systematically examining only small parts of them. The succe s of this technique lies in the
ability to achieve an appropriate encoding and subsequently to be able to examin the encoded versions. In this
paper we present a simple encoding scheme that lends itself to a simple verification procedure. As a result, we also
demonstrate how low-power (low bandwidth) continual fashion remote authentication can be enabled in long-range
wireless systems. Ours is a scheme that resorts to randomization techniques,hence provides only probabilistic
guarantees. However, to this end, we also demonstrate that these probabilities may be boosted sufficiently high
(e.g., as high as1 − 10−8) with only a few repetitions, incurring negligible effect on the power-savings.
As we have already mentioned, sensor-based samples can be quite diversified. They range from fingerprints,
retinal scans, to voice recognition. It does not necessarily have to be abiometric sample either. The common
verification procedure for all of them is some sort of pattern matching. Theexact detail of the matching algo-
rithm depends on the specific instance of the sample being considered. Unfortunately, it is not obvious how to
construct an encoding scheme given an arbitrary pattern recognition problem. In this paper, we therefore focus
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on a generic problem, that of computing the Hamming distance. The hamming distance between two strings is
simply the number of bit positions they differ. It is one of the simplest distance metrics that lie at the heart of many
pattern classification algorithms. For example, in a retinal scan match, retinal features are extracted in a binary
feature vector and then two binary feature vectors are compared for their Hamming distance. For us therefore,
the problem is abstracted into the following. A remote mobile device is presenting aoken(sU ) on behalf of user
U to a remote server. The server has in its database a template string (′U ) as a sample token forU . Only if the
hamming distance between the token and the sample is less than a specified threshold, access is granted.
The main motivation behind our scheme is the key observation : over long range wireless, transmission of one
bit is equivalent to millions of processor cycles in terms of power consumption[6]. Conventional wisdom in this
domain therefore has been to compute more and communicate less. Very recently, however this wisdom has been
challenged by some researchers, mostly arguing in the line that architectural features in modern processors hinder
the power savings expected from the reduction in communication [3, 1]. Forexample, in [1], the authors show
that compressing files before releasing it onto the wireless, may end up increasing the energy needs, due to various
factors such as the DRAM to cache ratio, cache miss ratesetc. In [3], the authors argue that the energy consumed
in refreshing the dynamic RAM associated with standard processors designed for mobile usages, such as Intel
Strong-Arm, usually exceeds the wireless transmission energy and thereby making it energy-profitable to ship a
block of data from a remote store instead of holding it in the DRAM for a long period of time. Our scenario how-
ever requires that the authentication token be in the main memory of a communicatingdev ce. Under a reasonable
power model, we show that following our scheme results in saving power up to70% of what would be required
if the whole key is naively transmitted. A similar gain in bandwidth is obvious since the crux of the scheme is to
reduce the communication.
One point to note here is that we have adopted a randomized scheme, and theguarantee of success therefore is
probabilistic. However, this is not a major concern, since it is understandable that any deterministic scheme would
require complete transmission of the keys and thereby not meeting the requirement of reducing bandwidth and
power. A more important concern however, is to quantify and assure howmuch breach in security is being allowed
as opposed to the power savings gained by such a scheme. In section 3 wewill show that probability of admitting
invalid keys can be made be substantially small. However, in a result pertainingto communication complexity,
Pang and Gamal showed that the minimum number of bits needed to estimate the hammingdista ce correctly is
Ω(n) [5]. Therefore, it is theoretically impossible to obtain a two sidedǫ-bound,i.e.,it is impossible to achieve
an estimation̂h (the estimated hamming distance) ofh (the original distance) so that(1 − ǫ)h ≤ ĥ ≤ (1 + ǫ)h
holds for all0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 with arbitrary high probability. We have adapted the techniques presented in[2] that tries
to safeguard against the underestimation. This is very important from the point of view of security. As a result
of biasing the strategy towards overestimating the distance, some of the legitimate keys may be declared as false.
Such cases are called false negatives. However, we show that although we cannot arbitrarily reduce the probability
of having false negatives (pneg, it is possible to keep it under an acceptable constant value. For example,having
pneg ≤ 0.2, enables as many as 80% of the legitimated keys to be accepted, thereby applying the savings of
bandwidth and power for 80% of the legitimate strings. This still boosts the overall power savings significantly.
For the rest twenty percent, that fall victim as false negatives, once deni d with the hamming signature, the whole
key can be transmitted. In section 3 we discuss this issue quite elaborately.
The contributions from this paper are the following. Perhaps the most interesting observation we make is that
certain randomized schemes could be used in the domain of mobile and ubiquitouscomputing as a means to reduce
bandwidth and power. Next, although we have adapted a technique from [2], it is not possible to clearly determine
theoretically the value of the each parameter that need to be set. To this end, wdemonstrate an experimental
methodology to bring the theory into practice. Moreover, the analysis in [2],had a limitation in that it tacitly
assumed the hash function to be parity (although the technique inherently is open t any hash function). We
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show that hash collision probability could be an important experimental knob that can be utilized set the systems
parameters. We present a new analysis for deriving the bounds as a result of allowing arbitrary hash-collision
probabilities. Finally, we quantify the bandwidth and power gains that can beachi ved by such a scheme under a
reasonable power model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the scheme in detail. In section 3 we carry








Figure 1. Encoding a message string M
In this section we describe the crux of the design of our protocol, i.e., the encoding scheme at the user end and
the verification process at the server end. we start by describing the encoding.
2.1 Encoding at the user side
Figure 1 captures the encoding.M is the authentication token of lengthn that the user wants to communicate
to the server. The encoding can be thought of as a standard coding scheme such as appending extra parity bits to
the end of a data block. In the figure,x denotes a subset of bits taken fromM (the bits inx are not necessarily
consecutive in the original stringM ). The redundancy bits in the encoded string consists of hash values taken
from all such stringsx of all possible lengths. A simple example of hashing is taking the parity ofx.
Figure 2 shows how a small subset is selected from the encoded string. The elements ofR are the hash values
of subsetsx of M . Assume that they are ordered alphabetically and according to length ofx. A small hash
vector is constructed fromR. A set of x-values are picked, sayx1, x2 . . . xt, in the increasing order of their
lengths, i.e.,|x1| < |x2| < . . . < |xt|. And then fromR, their hash values are collected into a small hash vector
[H(x1), H(x2) . . .H(xt)]. This hash vector is sent over the wireless network instead of the originalstringM . The
substrings arex1, x2 . . . are not chosen arbitrarily with the one restriction on their length. Their lengthi creases
exponentially, i.e., for someβ > 1, ( β is determined experimentally as we’ll describe later) we choose their
lengths as follows.
|x1| = β x2 = β
2 |x3| = β
3 . . . |xt| = β
t
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Figure 2. Creating the Hash vector
The longest such length that can be chosen this way is of coursen, the length ofM . Hencet = O(log n),
i.e.,the user sends a string of length exponentially smaller than the original string.For example, ifn is 1 MB (220),
and we use a hash of constant size, say 5 bytes, andβ = 2, then the hash vector would be only 100 bytes long.
Also note, that it is really not needed to compute the entire stringR which is exponentially long. Instead, given a
suitable random number generator, the user can randomly decide the substringsx1, x2 etcand then take their hash
values to crate the hash vector. We assume that both the user and the server have access to the same pseudo-random
generator. This is not a bottleneck as far as randomness is concerned.The two parties could exchange a random
seed at the start-up of a transaction so as to randomize their choices properly.
2.2 Verification at the Server side
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Figure 3. Comparison of Hash vectors
Figure 3 describes the actions taken on the server side. As already mentioned, we assume that the server and
the user share the same pseudo-random generator. At the start up theyexc ange a random seed and initialize the
generators in the same way. In the following steps they would generate exactly the same sequence of random
numbers. Hence, the server has full knowledge of what substringsx1, x2 . . . etcwere chosen by the user. The
server also chooses exactly the same sequence of substrings and creates a h sh vector in exactly the same way the
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(b) False positives and Negatives
Figure 4. Visualizing False positives and Negatives in the c orrelation matrix and as function of kr
At this point, the server compares the hash vectors at every coordinate.Notice that with increasing coordinates,
a hash vector contains hash values for substrings of increasing length.If the original two strings,i.e.,the user
tokenM and the server templateT differ in many positions, there is higher chance that they would differ in a
smaller substring picked from the same set of locations and therefore most likely would differ in their hash values
as well. Intuitively therefore, for strings having large hamming distance, thevalue ofk, which is an indicator for
the first length of substrings that differ in hash values, would be small. Anda high value ofk would indicate that
the strings are perhaps not too different from each other. Thus thereis a strong correlation betweenk and the
hamming distance of the strings being matched. In section 4, we establish this correlati n theoretically. However,
at this point we describe the experimental route that leads us towards makingthe decision on behalf of the server
- i.e.,how to authenticate a user from the observed value of the parameterk.
2.3 Experimental determination of cut-off k
Once the parameterk is evaluated, the server takes its authentication decision based on this value.As w have
already discussed in section 1, the server authenticates a string that is decided to be a close match to the template,
i.e.,a string having hamming distance not more than a threshold seta priori. We call this thresholdhc. The decision
process of the server is simple. It somehow chooses a cut-offk value, saykr, so that for allk < kr, the inference
is that the corresponding hamming distanceh > hc. This is intuitive, as we have seen that the hamming distance
andk values are correlated in an inverse fashion. Similarly, ifk ≥ kr, then the server declares that the string in
question has a hamming distanceh ≤ hc from the template and hence access is granted. Naturally, the choice of
kr decides the correctness and sensitivity of the decision. A choice of highkr would be too conservative; while
it will cut off almost all strings withh > hc, at the same time it will not allow many legitimate strings that have
h ≤ hc, yet, resulted in a lower value fork. We now describe how to make a choice ofkr on an experimental
basis. Consider the matrix shown in figure 4(a). The rows are marked by increasing hamming distances. And
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the columns are marked by increasingk values. The(i, j)-th entry in this matrix denotes the probability that a
string of hamming distancehi resulted in the observed valuek = kj . Observe that for a given rowhc and column
kr, the bottom right rectangle of the matrix therefore embody the total probability of false positives, i.e.,strings
which in spite of having a larger hamming distance (thanc) give rise to a largerk value (than the cut-offkr).
Similarly, the upper left rectangle of the matrix signifies the total probability forfalse negatives, i.e.,the strings
having a low hamming distance yet rejected because of lowerk values observed. Before deploying the system, it is
reasonable to experimentally estimate these probabilities. Once this matrix is estimated, the choice is determined
by the need of the application. For every combination of(hc, kr), there is a specific ratio of false positive and false
negatives; the application can choose the cut-off for which this ratio suits the most. We will elaborate further on
this in evaluation section; we will establish that by choosing so, the application really does not make a great deal
of compromise in its security.
3 Evaluation
3.1 Security Assertions
In this section we present the evaluation of our methodology. As discussedin s ction 2, we have determined
the systems parameters experimentally. The first step towards this is the evaluation of the correlation matrix (M )
presented in figure 4(a). To do so, we have randomly generated many templa s. For each such template, we
generated a large number of proof strings of different hamming distances. W varied these hamming differences
starting from 1% up to 40% of the length of the original string. For each proof string the hash vector is computed
and the same is compared with the hash vector generated from the corresponding template string. This comparison
results into an observed value ofk. If the hamming distance ish, the(h, k) entry is incremented by one. Finally
all entries are normalized between 0 and 1. Normalization, however, is optional. After M is determined, we
determine the cut-offk. Note that this depends on the cut-off hamming distance. Typically, the applications gen-
erate legitimate proof strings that always lie within a certain distance from the original. Let’s denote this distance
percentage byh1. This means, any string within percentage distanceh1, should be accepted with high probability.
Similarly, there is another boundary,h2 ≥ h1 such that any string with percentage distance more thanh2 should
be rejected with very high probability. While the gap between the two values is applic tion specific, a non-zero
gap is quite natural. In other words, if a fingerprint that has a percentagdifference of 5% with the template should
be accepted with a high probability, another string with a distance of 6% shouldalso be accepted with equal or
slightly less probability. In summary, there should be a gradual fall in acceptance rate betweenh1 andh2; afterh2,
the acceptance rate should become as close to zero as possible. We choose a cut-off hamming distancehc, which
is in the middle,h1 < hc < h2. hc could be chosen in many ways, as linear or non-linear function ofh1 andh2.
However, for our experiments, we have simply chosen ashc = (h1 − h2)/2. Once, the cut-off hamming distance
is fixed, the next task is to determine the cut-offk rom the correlation matrix. We have already described this
procedure in section 2.3.
Now we describe the main results of our experiments and demonstrate the validityof our methodology. We
have performed our experiments with different string lengths and over varied range of other parameters. Figure
5(a) depicts the expected value of observedk as a function of the hamming distance in a typical experiment. This
is generated from the normalized entries of the correlation-matrix. As expected, the expected value ofk decreases
with increasing percentage distance. This is due to the fact that strings with larger distance are quickly distin-
guished by samples of smaller sizes. Figure 5(b) presents the variance ofobservedk. Interestingly enough, the
variance too decreases monotonically with increasing percentage difference. This means, for legitimate strings
that are close match to the original template string, observed values ofk are distributed over a larger range. This
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(b) Variation ofσ(k) with h
Figure 5. Variation of Expectation and the variance of obser ved value of k with the Hamming distance.
For these experiments the string length was chosen as n = 4096 and β = 1.3
diminishes. The low variance at this end of the spectrum allows us to estimate morecorrectly whether a string is
illegitimate enabling sharpening of the bound for false positives which is more important from security point of
view.
We have experimented with several values ofh1 andh2. We present a typical set of results just as a guideline
of how things turn out for the experiments. Since this is a continuation of the sam experiments that we described
before, the string length is fixed atn = 4096 bits andβ = 1.3. We seth1 = 6% andh2 = 14% and thereby
hc = 10%. This choice is somewhat arbitrary. However, the overall pattern of ourexperiments is quite independent
of the specific choice ofhc which is normally a requirement of the application. Figure 6(a) presents the fals
positives and negatives as a function of the cut-offk for hc = 10%. This means, if we setkr = 8, we will have
more than 20% false positives (unacceptable) and similar number of false negatives. Following our method, we
setkr = 9, that jointly minimizes the false positives and negatives. And then we repeat the experiments forc = 5
times. Repeating the experiment means preparing 5 different hash vectorson independent random trials. The
string is accepted ifcmajority = 3 of the hash vectors lead to the acceptance,i.e.,an observed valuek value of
greater than or equal to9. The final message string will contain the collection of all five hash vectors.Figure 6(b)
depicts the results after these repeated trials; the X-axis denotes the hamming dista ces and the Y-axis denotes the
normalized number (of accepted and rejected strings respectively). It isobserved that all strings with percentage
distance less than 5, are accepted with high probability. Similarly, almost all the strings with distance more than
fourteen percent, are rejected. How many bits are communicated finally? Forthese experiments, we used a hash
with 16 buckets,i.e.,to represent a hash value we need 4 bits. We chose to sample up to a lengthβ20, i.e., the each
hash vectors have20 entries in it. Thus each hash vector is 80 bits long. And after five repeated trials the final string
will be 400 bits. This is the final size to be communicated over the network. However, notice that as the string
















































































































(b) Accepts and Rejects after five repeated trials
Figure 6. Determining kc and results after repeated trials
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3.2 Analysis of Power consumption
In this section we provide an analysis of the amount of power savings that can be achieved by deploying the
proposed scheme. In general, such estimation can be quite complicated, the consumption of power being a func-
tion of many factors such as processor architecture (including the CPU and memory subsystems), the network link
that involves analog components and also software factors such as the operating system, exact implementation
of systems libraries and so on. Instead of stressing on fine-grain precision, we evaluate our figure of merit in a
rather coarse-grain accuracy. The main power-drainers involved in this scenario are the processor, memory, and
the network link. We compare two alternative methods; sending the whole data block naively over the wireless,
and sending the hamming-distance sensitive hash-vector instead of the datablock. Since, some computation is
involved in the second case, we have to estimate the power consumed by the processor. The processing power
consists of two parts : the energy consumed at the CPU by the instructions and the energy spent due to the cache-
miss and memory accesses. Since the additional memory requirement of our scheme (over the baseline case) is
very small, essentially just the size of the hash vector that would easily fit into the local cache of any modern
processor, we can assume that the additional power consumption related tom m ry/cache can be kept out of the
consideration and that we can solely focus oninstruction level power analysis[7]. According to this scheme, en-
ergy consumed by each instruction is measured in isolation and then the total power is evaluated from the profile
of the machine code. The consumption naturally varies from one instruction toano her, however, one can consider
an average case or worst case picture.
n original size of the key
eproc average energy for executing one instruction
enet average energy to transmit one bit
Ni number of instructions needed to compute one hash vector
b bits needed to represent one digest
f size of the hash vector
v = fb size of one hash vector
τ number of repeated trials
I = τ.Ni total number of instructions
Table 1. Parameters relevant for power-analysis
Table 1 denote the parameters of interest for computing the power consumption. The total power consumption
for the first case (sending the whole key) is given byE1 = nenet. 1 In the second case, there are two factors,
processing and transmission and the total energy is given byE2 = venet + Ieproc. Hence, the ratio of energy














Notice thatv = O(log n), and the fractionvτ/n falls sharply as the sizen of the data block increases. For
example, for a data size of 4Kb, hash bucket sizeb = 4 bits, τ = 5 repeated trials, and a hash vector length
f = 20, the length of the transmitted hamming sketch isvτ = fbτ = 400. According to an estimation provided in
[6], transmitting one bit on the wireless over a distance of about hundred meters is equivalent to 3000 instructions
1Although there is some minimal processing required, such as byte copying, we assume the power is negligible. If anything such
assumption favors underestimation of the savings that we predict
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on a standard processor. Which meanseproc/enet = 1/3000. Although this is a rough estimate and also couple
of year old, the scenario has changed only in favor of low power processing. While long range transmission is
limited by the physical factors beyond control, modern processors are becoming increasingly power efficient so
far computing is concerned. At any rate, assumingeproc/enet = 1/3000, and noticing that it takes about 30000












As n grows, the factorE2/E1 keeps constantly decreasing. As we have already seen in section 3.1, thetotal
bandwidth and power savings actually depend on the false negatives; every time a legitimate string is rejected as
false, the whole key is communicated in order to convince the verifier at the remote end. The fraction of such false




= 0.2 + (0.8)(0.10025) ≈ 0.28
Therefore, amortized over many transmissions, such a scheme results in bandwidth and power savings up to72%.
4 Deriving the bound for arbitrary hash buckets
In this section we provide a theoretical analysis of what happens if the hashing i not just parity, and is allowed
to take on any arbitrary hash bucket size. Table 2 lists the variables necessary for this analysis.
h hamming distance
µ hash collision probability
X the proof sting
Y the template string
Xl l-th sample chosen from the proof string
Yl l-th sample chosen from the template string
Table 2.
We estimate the bounds on the estimation ofh. Note that for any independent samplel, ( of lengthβl ), the
probability that theb-th bits of the template-sample and proof-sample ish/n. This is simply because the two
strings differ inh/n fraction of bits. Hence we have the following set of equations :
Pr[ (Xl)b 6= (Yl)b] = h/n ∀1 ≤ b ≤ βl
Pr[ (Xl)b = (Yl)b] = 1 − h/n
Settingδ = (1 − h/n), we getPr[Xl 6= Yl] = 1 − (1 − h/n)β
l
= 1 − δ(β
l).
Now we estimate the error probability.µ is the probability of failure in a collision free hashingH(x). To do
so, we first observe the probability of having a collision in hashing for two distinct samples of lengthβl. This the
conditional probability given byPr[H(Xl) = H(Yl)|Xl 6= Yl]. Now, observe from Bayes’ Theorem
2by examining the machine code on an x-86 processor
11
Pr [ H( Xl) = H(Yl)|Xl 6= Yl] =
Pr[H(Xl)=H(Yl)∩Xl 6=Yl]
Pr[Xl 6=Yl]
The denominator on the right-hand side is the probability of false prediction and plugging in the values amounts
to µ(1−δ(β
l)). Hence the probability of not making a false prediction is1−µ(1−δ(β
l)). Our objective is to tightly
estimateh. However, since a two-way sharp bound is not possible, we focus on minimiz g the false positives. We
set the probability of no false prediction overk samples of geometrically increasing length very close to 1. That
will allow us conservatively estimate the hamming distance.
∏
l
1 − µ(1 − δ(β
l)) ≥ 1 − ǫ




l)] ≥ 1 − ǫ
At this stage, we need a first order Taylor series approximation. Setλ = h/n and thenδ(β
l) becomes
(1 − h/n)(β
l) ≈ 1 − λβl
So the inequality becomes
∏
l
[1 − µλβl] ≥ 1 − ǫ
Setφ = µλ. We get,
(1 − φβ)(1 − φβ2) . . . (1 − φβk) ≥ 1 − ǫ
Further approximating with the product terms, we set,
(1 − φβ)k ≥ 1 − ǫ
Or in other words, we get a bound onk, the first sample length we see any difference of the hash values as a




And substituting the values for different quantities and further simplifying weget a bound onh, the hamming




1 − (1 − ǫ)1/k
µβ
The above equation tells us that our method underestimatesh with no more than a failure probabilityǫ. This
ǫ is a free parameter and can be set to any user-specified value. Depending o the required success probability,
we have to set the length of the hash vector. The bounds can be further improved with repeated trials; this can be
shown by a Chernoff-bound type argument. For such a tehnique the read r c n consult [4].
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